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The authors propose that culture affects people through their perceptions of what is consensually
believed. Whereas past research has examined whether cultural differences in social judgment are
mediated by differences in individuals’ personal values and beliefs, this article investigates whether they
are mediated by differences in individuals’ perceptions of the views of people around them. The authors
propose that individuals who perceive that traditional views are culturally consensual (e.g., Chinese
participants who believe that most of their fellows hold collectivistic values) will themselves behave and
think in culturally typical ways. Four studies of previously well-established cultural differences found
that cultural differences were mediated by participants’ perceived consensus as much as by participants’
personal views. This held true for cultural differences in the bases of compliance (Study 1), attributional
foci (Study 2), and counterfactual thinking styles (Study 3). To tease apart the effect of consensus
perception from other possibly associated individual differences, in Study 4, the authors experimentally
manipulated which of 2 cultures was salient to bicultural participants and found that judgments were
guided by participants’ perception of the consensual view of the salient culture.
Keywords: culture, cross-country comparison, norms, priming
Cultural competence is “not all of what an individual knows and
thinks and feels about his world. It is his theory of what his fellows
know, believe, and mean, his theory of the code being followed, the
game being played, in the society into which he was born. It is this
theory to which a native actor refers when interpreting the unfamiliar
or the ambiguous . . . [yet] not every individual shares precisely the
same theory of the cultural code . . . .” (Keesing, 1974, p. 89)
A recurring lesson in social psychology is that individuals act on
the beliefs that they perceive to be widespread in their society,
community, and group (e.g., Cialdini & Trost, 1998; Jetten, Post-
mes, & McAuliffe, 2002; Latane´ & Darley, 1968; Mead, 1934;
Newcomb, 1961; Paluck, 2009; Sherif, 1936). When making ev-
eryday interpretations, individuals tend to rely on the ideas they
assume are shared—on “common sense” or social representations
(Moscovici, 1976). Yet this lesson has commanded little attention
in the cross-cultural literature (cf. Kashima, 2008). Cultural vari-
ations in social cognition have been explained almost exclusively
in terms of what individuals see inside themselves (self-concepts,
personal values and beliefs), rather than what individuals see when
looking outward at their social environments (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991; Schwartz, 1992; Triandis, 1989). This focus of
cross-cultural research on individuals’ private, inward views is
particularly surprising given that culture is generally understood to
be a collective phenomenon that exists, to some extent, externally
and publicly (Geertz, 1973).
This article advances a different model of how the patterns of
our native culture come to shape our thoughts and behaviors,
drawing on theories emphasizing the sharedness of cultural knowl-
edge and individuals’ knowledge of its sharedness (Geertz, 1983;
Keesing, 1974). A culture is a tradition of knowledge and practice
that is shared, albeit imperfectly, across the members of a society
and across its generations (Chiu & Hong, 2006; Lehman, Chiu, &
Schaller, 2004). When communicating with ingroup members,
people continuously make reference to ideas in the cultural tradi-
tion to establish common ground, which gives rise to perceptions
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that one’s fellows share and endorse these ideas (Kashima, 2008;
Kashima, Klein, & Clark, 2008). As we strive to see the world
“through the eyes of others” to be “objective” and reach epistemi-
cally sound judgments, we think and act on ideas perceived to be
consensual with little reservation. This is a means by which pre-
vailing cultural patterns reproduce themselves in our thoughts and
actions (Bourdieu, 1979; Strauss, 2004). This contemporary anal-
ysis owes a debt to Mead’s (1934) classical thesis that “it is in the
form of the generalized other . . . that the community exercises
control over the conduct of its individual members” (p. 155).
We present support for our argument in three cross-national
comparative studies and one study using an experimental manip-
ulation with bicultural participants. Before elaborating our model
and describing the empirical tests, we review how past researchers
have tested mechanisms of cultural influence within cross-national
comparative studies.
Cross-National Comparisons
Although culture can be studied with various methods
(D. Cohen, 2007), one primary strategy for identifying mecha-
nisms of cultural influence on behavior is searching for individual
differences that mediate effects of country. Many cultural differ-
ences in judgment (e.g., attributional focus on individual as op-
posed to group actors) have clear conceptual linkages to the
dimensions on which cultures have been traditionally contrasted,
such as individualism versus collectivism (Menon, Morris, Chiu,
& Hong, 1999). Hence, researchers have developed instruments to
measure individual differences in endorsement of self-conceptions,
values, attitudes, and beliefs (Triandis, 1989). The strategy is often
described as “unpacking” the country effect into effects of
individual-level characteristics. Despite the popularity of this ap-
proach, recent meta-analyses have concluded that measures of
personal endorsement of collectivist values have limited power in
explaining the differences between North Americans and East
Asians in social cognition biases (Oyserman, Coon, & Kem-
melmeier, 2002; Takano & Osaka, 1999). We argue that much of
this research paradigm is sound—country effects on judgment can
be unpacked into individual-level effects and, in many cases, are
related to the previously implicated cultural dimensions (e.g.,
collectivism). However, the important individual difference is not
inward-looking internalized values (personal endorsement of col-
lectivism) but, rather, outward-looking social perceptions (percep-
tion that collectivism is widely endorsed in one’s society).
Established Paradigm: Culture in Self-Conceptions and
Personal Beliefs
Psychologists have assumed predominantly that cultural influ-
ence runs through traits like those studied in other areas of psy-
chology. Researchers have looked for the imprint of cultural di-
mensions, such as collectivism, on self-concepts (Singelis, 1994),
personality traits (Inkeles & Levinson, 1969), attitudes (Triandis,
1989), beliefs (Kashima, Siegal, Tanaka, & Kashima, 1992), and
especially values (Schwartz, 1992; cf. Bond, 2002). However,
accumulating evidence suggests sharp limitations to this paradigm;
meta-analyses (Oyserman et al., 2002; Takano & Osaka, 1999)
have found that whereas Japanese and American individuals vary
in social judgments, there is no reliable difference in self-related
collectivist values.
To some extent, limitations in the evidence may reflect super-
ficial methodological limitations, rather than deeper conceptual
ones. In particular, recent research (Heine, Buchtel, & Noren-
zayan, 2008; Heine, Lehman, Peng, & Greenholtz, 2002; Peng,
Nisbett, & Wong, 1997) noted the problem that participants re-
spond to subjective self-report tasks by rating their own charac-
teristics in comparison with those of the typical person in their own
culture. To illustrate, suppose Americans rated their weight on a
subjective scale relative to the typical American and Japanese did
so relative to the typical Japanese. The average self-ratings would
not differ by country. To discover the actual group difference that
Americans are heavier, one would have to ask participants to
report their weight on an objective scale. In sum, people’s sense of
what is typical or consensual serves as an implicit standard of
comparison, biasing responses in ways that obscure actual group
differences.
Nonetheless, in pointing out this methodological problem, past
researchers may have missed a more substantive role of the im-
plicit standards constituted by perceived consensus. Implicit stan-
dards may also guide decisions and behavior. That is, Americans’
knowledge of the typical American’s ample girth lead them to
subjectively describe themselves as thin but encourage them to eat
more! An analogy can be drawn to two functions of reference
groups distinguished by Kelley (1952): a comparative function
(i.e., when uncertain how to describe themselves, people evaluate
themselves relative to the group standard) and a normative func-
tion (when uncertain what to do, people anchor on the standard to
construct their response). A classic example of normative influ-
ence is Sherif’s (1936) finding that participants’ judgments of
ambiguous stimuli are affected by those of the others in their
group, and this influence of the perceived consensus persists even
when participants subsequently make judgments in private. Anal-
ogously, perceptions of broader societal or cultural consensus
(“common sense”) may play an important role in guiding individ-
uals’ thoughts and behavior. This may be an underappreciated
mechanism through which received cultural patterns are repro-
duced in people’s cognitions and actions, even when they hold
personal beliefs to the contrary.
Proposed Paradigm: Culture in Perceived Consensus
We argue that key cultural differences in social cognition are
carried by differences in individuals’ perceptions of their culture’s
consensual beliefs, beyond any influences of differences in indi-
viduals’ personal commitments to the beliefs. This argument in-
volves two premises worth elaborating: Perceived cultural consen-
sus is a distinct construct, and it has distinct effects in producing
culturally typical actions and thoughts.
Perceived Cultural Consensus: A Distinct Construct
In making the case for people’s perceptions of consensual views
as an important explanatory variable in carrying cultural patterns,
it is important to establish that the construct is distinct from similar
constructs that have been studied previously. First, it has been
shown that individuals often project their personal attitudes onto
some kinds of peer groups (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). This
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phenomenon can be recognized in cases where individuals’ per-
sonal views and perceived group views are highly similar. How-
ever, several recent studies measuring perceived consensus at the
national or cultural level have found that personal views and
perceived consensus views are not highly correlated (Fischer,
2006; Hofstede, 2005; Kurman & Ronen-Eilon, 2004; Wan, Chiu,
Tam, et al., 2007).
Second, perceived consensus is not simply a reflection of ob-
jective consensus. Many researchers have investigated the objec-
tive consensus in cultures (Romney, Boyd, Moore, Batchelder, &
Brazill, 1996) and communities (descriptive norms; see Cialdini &
Trost, 1998). Rather than merely reflecting the objective consensus
(or reflecting them with error variance around the true value),
people’s perceptions of consensus tend to be systematically biased.
In the phenomenon of pluralistic ignorance, groups hold mistaken
perceptions of their own consensus, which go unchecked because
people never directly observe their fellows’ values, attitudes, and
other inner characteristics (Katz & Allport, 1931; Prentice &
Miller, 1993; Schanck, 1932). Recent studies have demonstrated
pluralistic ignorance with regard to the modal values and beliefs in
one’s country (Hirai, 2000; Robins, 2005; Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al.,
2007). The bias is often toward misperceiving that traditional
views are still widespread; a society’s perception of itself tends to
lag behind actual change in people’s private beliefs and values. For
instance, the persistence of caste-based hiring in India has been
traced to inflated perceptions of consensual support for caste
values (Kuran, 1995). Similarly, studies of segregation attitudes in
the United States in the 1960s found that shifting values were not
fully reflected in the racial values that White people perceived to
be consensual among other White people (O’Gorman, 1975,
1979). It is important to note that estimates of White segregationist
sentiment were most inflated for individuals whose social net-
works were all White (regardless of their personal attitudes;
O’Gorman & Garry, 1977). That is, individuals who communi-
cated solely within their ingroup had the strongest traditionality
bias in their perceptions of its consensus.
Communication research suggests that ingroup communication
gives rise to biased perceptions of consensus in several ways
(Bruner, 1990; Jovchelovitch, 2007; Latane´ & L’Herrou, 1996;
Moscovici, 1988; Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Schegloff,
1991). Speakers’ assumptions about the “common ground” of
shared knowledge with an audience tacitly shape what they say
and how they say it (Clark & Brennan, 1991). When facing an
ingroup audience, speakers tend to frame their message in terms of
constructs from the shared cultural tradition (Kashima, Klein, &
Clark, 2008). An incidental byproduct of this communication
process, however, is that the audience forms an impression of the
speaker as personally aligned with traditional views, and in two-
way communication, both sides come away with inflated assump-
tions about the consensuality of traditional views (Kashima, 2000)
and stereotypes (Haslam, 1997). Research on communication net-
works and pluralistic ignorance in communities reveals that indi-
viduals’ perceptions of the consensus are highly determined by
tradition-biased content of what ingroup members say to each
other and have little to do with projection of personal beliefs (Kitts,
2003). That is, communication with ingroup members draws on
the shared familiarity with a cultural tradition and, in so doing,
perpetuates the perception of consensual traditionality.
Representations of consensus also can be distinguished from the
ingroup prototypes studied in social identity research (Turner,
1985). Although individuals can form both kinds of representa-
tions about their cultural group, these structures coalesce through
different cognitive processes, guided by different motivations,
resulting in different biases. Consensus representations do not
require awareness of one’s culture as a category; hence, even in the
most traditional cultures, people, like fish unaware of water, may
lack experiences with cultures and awareness of their own culture
as a collective. Prototypes, however, require reflecting on the
relevant social category and distilling a fuzzy set of features
(which could be beliefs but also could be appearance, lifestyle,
diet, etc.) that maximally resembles exemplars of the category and
maximally differs from those of contrasting categories (the “meta-
contrast principle”; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987). Whereas consensus
representations serve coordination and communication functions
(and hence are biased toward traditionality), prototypes serve
self-related motives, such as self-esteem and status (and hence are
biased toward positive differentiations from other categories; Ta-
jfel & Turner, 1979). Whereas consensus representations are
slowly evolving assumptions about common ground that lag be-
hind social change, group prototypes are highly variable across
social contexts and are continually reconstructed within each new
frame of reference on the basis of which self-categorizations
(gender, race, education) fit meaningfully and which contrasting
categories are salient (Turner, Oakes, Haslam, & McGarty, 1994).
The situationally changing salience of contrasting categories,
which in practice is often a matter of the presence of outgroup
members,1 highlights another bias of prototypes to be polarized
away from features of the comparison group (Hogg, 2004, p. 229).
In sum, ingroup prototypes differ from perceived consensus in
their wider range of content features, their more reflective and
comparative process through which they are formed, their mercu-
rial malleability, and their bias toward positivity and contrast with
currently salient comparison category, rather than bias toward
traditionality.
Our proposal, in summary, is that people carry around implicit
perceptions of consensus beliefs and values, close to what is
vernacularly called “common sense.” These representations arise
as a byproduct of everyday coordination and communication with
fellow adherents of a tradition. These perceptions are not mere
projections of self onto a group, nor reflections of the group’s
objectively shared beliefs, nor prototype representations con-
structed from comparisons of one’s social category with contrast-
ing categories.
Influence on Cognitions and Actions
The claim that people’s thoughts and behaviors are guided by
their outward-looking perceptions of what others believe, as op-
posed to their inward-looking conceptions of themselves, is coun-
1 Contrasts commonly occur between different categories at the same
level of abstraction (e.g., women vs. men, artists vs. scientists), yet this is
not the only possibility. Self-categorization theorists have also described
other contrasts, such as between one’s category and subordinate or super-
ordinate categories, although such representations are less clearly “proto-
types” in Rosch’s sense (Rosch & Mervis, 1975).
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terintuitive at first glance. However, related arguments have been
advanced by a number of social theorists. As discussed previously,
sociologists such as Mead and Bourdieu have claimed that soci-
ety’s influence over the individual works through the individual’s
reliance on ideas that he or she perceives to be widely shared. An
influential work by the philosopher Taylor (1985) argued that
conceptions of agency guide behaviors not only because they are
shared but also because we know them to be shared. This enables
us to use them to comprehend others’ actions and expectations, to
anticipate how they will evaluate and respond to our actions, and
so on. Consider that much of the difficulty of operating in an
unfamiliar culture is ignorance of the shared beliefs that enable one
to choose actions that can send the intended signals. Among
immigrants, greater accuracy in perceptions of the consensual
beliefs of the host society is a key predictor of adjustment (Kurman
& Ronen-Eilon, 2004; Li & Hong, 2001).
Studies of communication provide, perhaps, the richest evidence
for effects of perceived consensus on behavior. Strauss (2004)
found that the perceived sharedness (or cultural standing) of an
idea determines in which kinds of conversations or discourses it
gets expressed. As noted earlier, perceptions that an idea is shared
by one’s audience make communicators more likely to use it as
common ground (Krauss & Chiu, 1998; Lau, Chiu, & Lee, 2001).
In group decision-making contexts, particularly when the goal of
consensus is emphasized, individuals are more likely to reference
the information perceived to be shared by other members (Post-
mes, Spears, & Cihangir, 2001). In ingroup communication chains,
messages become conventionalized as a result of growing within
perceived consensual reference. (Bartlett, 1932). Lyons and
Kashima (2003) explored whether perceived consensus shapes
communication even beyond one’s assumptions about one’s im-
mediate conversation partner. These investigators manipulated
whether the participant’s current conversational partner was per-
ceived to share the stereotype, as well as whether this stereotype
was seen as broadly shared in the community. Participants com-
municated the stereotype information more when they perceived
the stereotype to be shared in the community, regardless of
whether they believed it to be shared by their immediate conver-
sation partner.
Other research has suggested that perceived cultural consen-
sus affects not only one’s public acts of communication but also
one’s private cognitions. A number of studies indicate that
heightened motivation to think in consensus with others leads
individuals to display judgmental biases traditional in their
culture. The motivation of need for cognitive closure (Kruglan-
ski & Weber, 1996) drives individuals to seek answers validated
by consensus with the salient ingroup. Cross-national studies
find that high (vs. low) need for closure individuals in each
country are more likely to exemplify the biases of its cultural
tradition when judging causes of outcomes (Chiu, Morris,
Hong, & Menon, 2000) or judging how to resolve conflicts (Fu
et al., 2007). Also, inducing need for closure through time
pressure increases culturally conventional biases (Chiu, Morris,
Hong, & Menon, 2000). Other manipulations that require par-
ticipants to state reasons before making choices (Briley, Morris,
& Simonson, 2000) or make them accountable for their deci-
sions to ingroup others (Gelfand & Realo, 1999) similarly
amplify culturally traditional response biases, most likely be-
cause these manipulations activate perceived cultural consensus
as a template for acceptable judgment.
Summary and Overview of the Present Research
The present studies explore the role of perceived consensus as a
mechanism that carries cultural biases in judgment. The contribu-
tion of this research lies in distinguishing these outward social
representations of culture from inward self-representations. Al-
though some voices in cultural psychology have insisted that
culture and self are mutually constituted and inseparable (Shweder,
1990), this view forecloses investigation of how culture and self
interact. Our analysis, instead, focuses on a socially constructed
representation of culture of which individuals have different read-
ings. Whereas other perspectives also focus on individual varia-
tions, such as the degree to which individuals align their self-
concepts with their cultural identity—the degree of cultural
identification (Hogg, 2004)—we focus on variation in perceived
consensus that is independent of the self-concept. After reporting
our studies investigating the role of perceived consensus in carry-
ing cultural patterns of behavior, we return in the General Discus-
sion to this question of how it interacts with self and how our
approach contrasts with and complements other conceptualizations
of culture and cognition.
Despite the increasing research attention to perceived consen-
sus, no studies have thoroughly tested whether perceived consen-
sus is a mechanism for cultural effects on social cognition, above
and beyond the mechanism of personal views. The present re-
search tests this hypothesis in three cross-national comparative
studies and one study using an experimental manipulation with
bicultural participants. Specifically, we draw on several previously
established cultural differences in social cognition. Study 1 exam-
ines whether the classic collectivism dimension moderates the
cultural differences in sensitivity to compliance appeals: whether
personal consistency is more appealing in low collective culture
and social proof is more appealing in high collective culture. We
predicted that the key to the cultural differences in these interper-
sonal responses is individuals’ perceptions of the level of collec-
tivism of their fellows, rather than their personal level
of collectivism. In Studies 2 and 3, we compared samples across
countries to explore mediators of cultural differences in more
intra-personal forms of social cognition: causal attribution (Study
2; Morris & Peng, 1994) and counterfactual thinking (Study 3;
Chen, Chiu, Roese, Tam, & Lau, 2006).2 However, this strategy of
analyzing mediation in cross-national effects cannot conclusively
establish the mechanism. Hence, in Study 4, we recruited bicul-
tural participants and experimentally manipulated which culture
was salient to test whether their judgments followed distinctively
from their perceptions of consensus relevant to the salient culture.
This result would show more incisively that an individual’s rep-
resentation of the consensus related to a given culture is a mech-
anism in generating judgments that conform to the culture’s biases.
2 Individuals whose social perception experiences span the cultural
boundary would form, on this basis, an ingroup prototype about their
culture. They would also form a perception of consensus on the basis of
their ingroup communication experiences. The types of (differentially
biased) representations of their culture would play different roles in shap-
ing their behavior.
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Study 1: Compliance
The most common individual difference in cross-cultural studies
is the individualist–collectivist (I–C) value dimension. Triandis
(1989) defined individualists as those who “give priority to per-
sonal goals over the goals of collectives” and collectivists as those
who “either make no distinctions between personal and collective
goals, or if they do make such distinctions, they subordinate their
personal goals to the collective goals” (p. 509). Triandis (1989)
called U.S. culture the prototype of individualism and Chinese
culture the prototype of collectivism. More generally, collectivism
characterizes most non-Western societies: in Eastern Europe, Latin
America, Africa, India, Asia, and so forth. In the present study, we
tested whether differences between national cultures in rates of
compliance with different persuasion principles arise from indi-
viduals’ perceived societal I–C values or from their personal I–C
values.
Two classic persuasion principles are personal consistency and
social proof. That is, people are more likely to comply with a
request when it is drawn to their attention that they have consis-
tently taken the same action in the past (personal consistency) and
that the action is supported by the majority of their peers (social
proof). A cross-cultural comparison by Cialdini et al. (1999) found
that Americans, compared with Poles, are more susceptible to
consistency information and less susceptible to social proof infor-
mation.
This study is noteworthy because it is one of the few studies in
the cross-cultural literature in which an individual difference mea-
sure of I–C statistically mediated the country effect on social
judgments. Perhaps not coincidentally, however, this study used a
different operationalization of I–C than most studies in the litera-
ture. Cialdini et al. (1999) used the Cultural Orientation Scale
(Bierbrauer, Meyer, & Wolfradt, 1994), which was originally
designed to differentiate the perceived national norm and personal
value components of individualism and collectivism. The scale
consists of 13 pairs of questions. The first question in each pair
asks the participant to report how frequently an I–C-related be-
havior occurs in the participant’s country (perceived cultural con-
sensus). The second question asks the participant the extent to
which the participant values the given behavior (personal value).
Cialdini et al. did not distinguish between these two types of
questions; rather, they measured I–C by aggregating responses to
the two types of questions. In Study 1, we reanalyzed these data,
separating measures of personal value from perceived cultural
consensus. We expected that Americans would perceive individ-
ualism to be widely shared in the United States, whereas Polish
participants would perceive collectivism to be widely shared in
Poland. Further, we predicted that this difference in perceived
consensual I–C would account for the national difference in com-
pliance tendencies over and beyond what is accounted for by
personal I–C values.
Method
Participants
A total of 505 undergraduate psychology students participated
in this study. Among them, 235 (26.8% men) were students from
Arizona State University in the United States, and 270 (40.37%
men) were students from the University of Silesia in Poland. As
there was a higher percentage of women in the American sample,
2(1, N  505)  10.39, p  .001, we controlled for the effects of
gender in our analyses; no gender effects were found.
Measures
Cultural Orientation Scale. Participants were given the Cul-
tural Orientation Scale (COS; Bierbrauer et al., 1994), which
measures individuals’ perception of cultural members’ I–C orien-
tation and their personal values. There are 26 items, constituting 13
pairs of questions. The first question in each pair, the item mea-
suring perception of the consensual values in their culture, asks
participants to report how frequently an I–C-related behavior (e.g.,
doing something exactly as one wants to do, regardless of what
friends may think; consulting one’s family before making an
important decision) occurs in their country on a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (always). The second question
in each pair, the personal value item, asks participants to evaluate
their own behaviors on a 7-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (very
bad) to 7 (very good). From these two question types, we con-
structed separate scales for participants’ perceived consensual val-
ues (  .62) and their personal values (  .55), with higher
scores indicating higher levels of collectivism.
Experimental manipulations and compliance measure. Partic-
ipants read a hypothetical scenario in which the protagonist was
approached by a representative from a soft drink company and
asked to participate in a marketing research survey. The partici-
pants were asked to imagine themselves being the protagonist and
to rate their likelihood of complying with the request on a 9-point
Likert scale ranging from 0 (no likelihood) to 8 (very high likeli-
hood).
Half of the participants received consistency information. These
participants were asked to indicate the compliance likelihood if the
protagonist had (a) always and (b) never agreed to complete
similar surveys in the past. The remaining participants were pro-
vided with peer (fellow students) information; they indicated the
compliance likelihood when (a) all and (b) none of the partici-
pants’ peers complied with the request. Responses to consistency
and peer information were calculated as the difference between
responses to Conditions (a) and (b). These difference measures
controlled for individual differences in the general willingness to
comply with requests.
Results
Cultural Differences in Collectivism
As expected, the perceived cultural consensus was more collec-
tivistic (less individualistic) for Polish participants than for Amer-
ican participants. A Culture (Polish vs. American)  Type (per-
ceived consensus vs. personal value; within-participants factor)
analysis of variance (ANOVA) controlling for gender was per-
formed on responses to the COS. As Table 1 shows, the perceived
consensual collectivism was significantly higher for Polish partic-
ipants than for American participants (MPolish  3.56, SD  0.43
vs. MAmerican  3.16, SD  0.52), F(1, 503)  93.75, p  .001,
p
2  .16. In contrast, the two cultural samples did not differ in
personal collectivism (MPolish  3.81, SD  0.59 vs. MAmerican 
3.90, SD  0.69), F(1, 503)  2.70, ns.
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Cultural Difference in Compliance
Compared with Americans, Poles were influenced more by peer
information and less by consistency information. We performed a
regression analysis to test the main effects and the interaction
effect of culture (0 American, 1 Polish) and information (0
consistency information condition, 1  peer information condi-
tion). The Culture  Information interaction was significant ( 
0.16), t(504)  2.20, p  .05. As shown in Figure 1, the effect of
consistency information was stronger for the Americans than for
the Poles, t(289)  –1.73, p  .08, whereas the effect of peer
information was stronger for Poles than for Americans, t(216) 
1.69, p  .09, although both differences were only marginally
significant.
Furthermore, for both American and Polish participants, greater
perceived consensual collectivism was positively related to
the influence of peer information (rAmerican  .24, rPolish  .32)
and negatively related to the influence of consistency information
(rAmerican  –.33, rPolish  –.20). Greater personal collectivism was
not related to the influence of peer information (rAmerican  .08,
rPolish  .10) or consistency information (rAmerican  –.07, rPolish 
–.03).
Mediation Effect of Perceived Cultural Consensus
Following the procedure outlined by Muller, Judd, and Yzerbyt
(2005), we tested whether the effect of culture in moderating
susceptibility to information is mediated by individual’s percep-
tion of consensual collectivism. We entered the main effects of
culture, perceived consensual collectivism, and information, the
Culture  Information interaction, and the Perceived Consensual
Collectivism  Information interaction into a regression model to
predict the compliance likelihood ratings. Consistent with the
moderated mediation hypothesis, the Culture  Information inter-
action became nonsignificant in this analysis (standardized  
0.10), t(504)  1.23, ns, whereas the main effect of perceived
consensual collectivism remained significant (standardized  
0.14), t(504)  2.11, p  .05 (see Figure 2). The Sobel test results
supported the perceived consensual collectivism as a mediator of
the cultural difference in sensitivity to consistency versus peer
information (z  2.09, p  .05).
Discussion
Study 1 measured the degree of collectivism (versus individu-
alism) in Americans’ and Poles’ personal values and in their
perceptions of cultural consensus. Perceptions of cultural consen-
sus were more collectivistic for Poles than Americans, whereas
personal values did not differ across the two cultures. Most sig-
nificant, the cultural difference in perceived consensual collectiv-
ism statistically mediated the effect of national culture on compli-
ance: responses to consistency and peer information. This result
provides initial support for our argument that, beyond individuals’
personal values, their perceptions of cultural consensus drive their
degree of conformity to cultural traditional patterns of judgment.
Nevertheless, a critic might contend that using compliance judg-
ments as our dependent measure unfairly favors our account.
Compliance occurs in an interpersonal interaction in which con-
formity to shared norms may be necessary to avoid tension or
conflict. However, we assume that the pressure of social interac-
tion is not necessary for the role of perceived cultural consensus.
Even in purely intrapersonal thoughts, people anchor their judg-
ments on the patterns they assume to be consensual. To provide
further support for this argument, we conducted two more cross-
national comparisons that focus on mere intrapersonal processes:
casual attribution and counterfactual thinking.
Study 2: Causal Attribution
Study 2 addresses a much-noted cultural difference: East
Asians’ attributions for behavior are less likely than those of
Westerners to focus on an individual actor and are more likely to
focus on the social context (Miller, 1984; Morris & Peng, 1994).
It has been argued that perceivers in different cultures hold differ-
ent default beliefs or theories about behavior—Westerners dispo-
sitionism and East Asians situationism (Morris & Peng, 1994;
Norenzayan, Choi, & Nisbett, 2002)—albeit without direct evi-
dence that individual differences in participants’ beliefs mediate
the effects of national culture on attributions. We propose that the
more important variable may be participants’ beliefs about the
degree to which these theories are shared in their culture: that is,
Westerners (East Asians) see dispositionism (situationism) as the
cultural consensus, and hence, they anchor on it as a default
interpretation when making causal attributions.
This argument is consistent with the perspective that causal
attribution can be shaped by the relevant social context, by peo-
ple’s perception of what a given audience finds relevant and
reasonable (Sperber & Wilson, 1990). For example, when asked in
Figure 1. Compliance change as a function of culture and condition
information (Study 1).
Table 1
Personal Collectivism and Perceived Consensual
Collectivism (Study 1)
Variable
Polish American
M SD M SD
Personal collectivism 3.81 0.59 3.90 0.69
Perceived consensual collectivism 3.56 0.43 3.16 0.52
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a mail survey to explain a mass murder, participants emphasized
personal, dispositional explanations when they assumed a psychol-
ogist audience and more situational, contextual explanations when
they assumed a sociologist audience. (Norenzayan & Schwarz,
1999). That is, people provide causal attributions tailored to the
audience’s biases. Culture, as a shared communication context,
involves a perceived consensus about how behavior is best ex-
plained. Hence, cultural differences in attributional foci may be
mediated by participants’ perceptions of cultural consensus about
implicit theories of behaviors. We tested this idea in Study 2.
Method
Participants
To control for subculture variation, we recruited only ethnic
Chinese participants in Hong Kong and only ethnic White partic-
ipants in the United States. The participants were 64 Hong Kong
Chinese undergraduates (35.4% men) and 65 American undergrad-
uates (56.1% men). Most American participants identified them-
selves as European American (61 European Americans, 1 African
American, 1 Asian American, 1 Latino American, and 1 who did
not report his or her ethnicity). We retained all participants in the
American sample, although eliminating those who were not Euro-
pean American did not change the results. As there were signifi-
cantly more female participants in the Chinese sample, 2(1, N 
64)  6.07, p  .05, we included gender in the reported results.
Overall, gender did not have any significant main effect or inter-
actions in the analyses reported subsequently.
Measures
Participants responded to an attribution measure commonly
used in cross-cultural studies (Morris & Peng, 1994). The partic-
ipants saw a picture of a fish swimming leftward in front of other
fish and responded to two attribution items, as follows: (a) “To
what extent do you think the leftmost fish’s movements seem
influenced by internal cause?” Responses ranged from 1 (hardly at
all) to 5 (almost entirely). (b) “To what extent do you think the
leftmost fish’s movements seem influenced by other fish?” Re-
sponses ranged from 1 (hardly at all) to 5 (almost entirely).
Next, the participants received a measure of the participants’
personal beliefs in dispositional and situational theories of behav-
ior (Norenzayan et al., 2002). Participants read a description of
each theory of behavior and indicated their levels of agreement on
a Likert scale ranging from 1 (strongly disagree) to 9 (strongly
agree; see Appendix for the descriptions). Finally, they indicated
on the same scales their perceptions of the degree to which their
fellow members in the culture (“Hong Kong Chinese” for the
Hong Kong sample and “Caucasian Americans” for the American
sample) would agree with the two descriptions.3 A 10-min filler
task was inserted between the attribution measure and the personal
causal theory measures and between the personal belief measures
and the perceived consensual belief measures.
Results
Cultural Differences in Attribution
We replicated the past finding on cultural difference in causal
attribution. A Culture (Chinese vs. American)  Attribution (in-
ternal vs. external, within-participants factor) ANOVA controlling
for gender performed on the attribution items yielded a significant
two-way interaction, F(1, 126)  6.91, p  .01, p2  .05. As in
past research, Americans, compared with Chinese, made signifi-
cantly stronger internal attribution (MAmerican  3.66, SD  1.04
vs. MChinese  3.18, SD  1.00), F(1, 126)  6.89, p  .01, p2 
.05. External attribution showed a reverse pattern, albeit only
marginally significantly (MAmerican  2.47, SD  1.00 vs.
MChinese  2.81, SD 0.99), F(1, 126) 3.23, p .08, p2  .03.
Cultural Differences in Causal Beliefs
To examine cultural differences in causal theories, we per-
formed a three-way ANOVA on the causal theory measures,
including culture as a between-participants variable and beliefs
(dispositionism vs. situationism) and type (personal vs. perceived
consensus) as within-participants variables and controlling for
gender. The analysis yielded a significant three-way interaction,
F(1, 126)  8.72, p  .005, p2  .07. To understand the nature of
this interaction, we performed a Culture  Beliefs ANOVA sep-
arately for the personal beliefs and perceived consensual beliefs
measures. For the perceived consensual beliefs measures, the Cul-
ture  Beliefs interaction was significant, F(1, 126)  9.87, p 
.002, p2  .07. As shown in Table 2, American participants’
3 To minimize the demand characteristics that may evoke culturally
typically behaviors, studies were not presented as cross-cultural studies.
Study 1 was conducted at a psychology course as part of the course
requirements. Studies 2, 3, and 4 were introduced to participants as
research on social judgment.
 
β = 0.14* β = 0.36** 
Culture:
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(β = 0.16*) 
Figure 2. Perceived consensual collectivism mediates the effect of culture on susceptibility to consistency
versus peer information-based compliance inductions (Study 1).  p  .05.  p  .01.
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perceived consensual dispositionism (MAmerican  6.46, SD 
1.51) was higher than Chinese participants’ perceived consensual
dispositionism (MChinese  5.69, SD  1.68), F(1, 126)  7.58,
p  .007, p2  .06, whereas Chinese participants’ perceived
consensual situationism (MChinese  5.75, SD  1.72) was higher
than American participants’ perceived consensual situationism
(MAmerican  5.05, SD  1.75), F(1, 126)  5.88, p  .05, p2 
.03. However, the two cultural samples did not differ in their
personal dispositionism (MChinese  5.58, SD  1.72 vs. MAmeri-
can  5.54, SD  1.87), F(1, 126)  0.04, ns, nor personal
situationism (MChinese  4.84, SD  1.58 vs. MAmerican  4.78,
SD  1.78), F(1, 126)  0.05, ns. These results indicate that
perceived consensual beliefs is a candidate for mediating attribu-
tion judgments, but personal beliefs is not.
Mediating Effect of Perceived Cultural Consensus
To test whether perceived consensus in dispositionism mediates
the effect of culture on internal attribution, we regressed perceived
consensual beliefs in dispositionism on culture (0  Chinese, 1 
American) and found a significant effect of culture (standardized
  0.27), t(127)  2.82, p  .005. Our mediation analysis
focused on internal attribution only, because the cross-cultural
difference in external attribution was not significant. Next, we
regressed internal attribution on culture, and again, the effect of
culture was significant (standardized   0.23), t(127)  2.54,
p  .01. Finally, we regressed internal attribution on culture and
perceived consensual dispositionism simultaneously. As shown in
Figure 3, in this regression, the effect of culture was substantially
attenuated (standardized   0.18), t(127)  1.99, p  .05, and
perceived consensual dispositionism remained significant (stan-
dardized   0.20), t(127)  2.33, p  .02. The Sobel test result
indicated a significant mediation (z  1.96, p  .05), and the
mediation effect remained significant after we controlled for per-
sonal belief in dispositionism.
Discussion
Study 2 found that perceived consensual dispositionism partially
mediated effects of culture on internal attribution, but personal
belief in dispositionism did not. Whereas past research has mostly
assumed that the carriers of cultural biases in cognition are peo-
ple’s innermost values, beliefs, or self-concepts, this study sug-
gests that people’s habitual patterns of private thought are shaped
by their outward perceptions of consensus. Although we did not
observe a significant mediation effect of individuals’ personal
dispositionism beliefs in Study 2, we cannot conclude that personal
beliefs are not mediators of cultural differences in judgments. Past
studies have found evidence that some differences are mediated by
personal views and preferences, such as attitude–behavior consis-
tency beliefs (Kashima et al., 1992), personal expression values
(Kim & Sherman, 2007), and motivational predilections (Lalwani,
Shrum, & Chiu, 2009). Our argument does not dispute this; it
merely holds that perceptions of consensus at least partly mediate
cultural effects, even after controlling for effects of personal be-
liefs and values.
To further establish our thesis, in Study 3, we investigated
another intrapersonal, rather than interpersonal, judgment: peo-
ple’s private counterfactual thoughts. We demonstrate that peo-
ple’s perception of consensus in self-regulatory values affects how
they process their own experiences. In particular, when people
react to negative life experiences, they tend to do so in the ways
congruent with their perceptions of culturally consensual regula-
tory values.
Study 3: Counterfactual Thinking
Study 3 investigated cultural differences in valued modes of
self-regulation and their link to differences in counterfactual think-
ing biases (Chen et al., 2006). Promotion- and prevention-focus
refer to clusters of values about means for achieving ends; people’s
regulatory orientations form through their experiences with par-
enting styles and other social institutions (Higgins, 1999). Many
studies have observed that East Asians, compared with North
Americans, have stronger prevention focus and weaker promotion
focus (Higgins, 2008; Higgins, Pierro, & Kruglanski, 2007).
Table 2
Dispositionism and Situationism in Personal Beliefs and
Perceived Consensual Beliefs (Study 2)
Variable
Chinese American
M SD M SD
Personal belief
Dispositionism 5.58 1.72 5.54 1.87
Situationism 4.84 1.58 4.78 1.78
Perceived consensual belief
Dispositionism 5.69 1.68 6.46 1.51
Situationism 5.75 1.72 5.05 1.75
 
β = 0.20* β = 0.27** 
Culture:
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Dispositionism 
β = 0.18† 
(β = 0.23*) 
Internal  
Attribution 
Figure 3. Perceived consensual dispositionism mediates the effect of culture on internal attribution (Study 2).
† p  .1.  p  .05.  p .01.
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Promotion- and prevention-focused people tend toward different
types of counterfactual thoughts after a setback (Roese, Hur, &
Pennington, 1999). In a typical counterfactual study, participants
first recall a negative outcome and then generate a counterfactual
scenario to “undo” the outcome in the frame “If only . . . , then . . .”
(Roese, 1994). The relevant distinction is between additive and
subtractive counterfactuals. Additive counterfactuals simulate the
event turning out differently by inserting an additional factor into
the causal chain, whereas subtractive counterfactuals do so by
deleting a factor that was present in the actual causal chain (Roese,
1997). Roese et al. (1999) found that promotion focus induces
additive counterfactuals and that prevention focus induces subtrac-
tive counterfactuals. For example, to undo the outcome of “feeling
burnout at work,” promotion-focused participants would add ac-
tions to the scenario, such as “if only I had taken a vacation last
month, then I would not feel this burnout.” In contrast, prevention-
focused participants would subtract actions from the scenario, such
as “If only I had not taken on the additional assignment last month,
then I would not feel this burnout.”
Consistent with the aforementioned cross-cultural difference in
regulatory foci, there is evidence that East Asians differ from
North Americans in being more likely to generate subtractive
counterfactuals and less likely to generate additive counterfactuals
(Chen et al., 2006). In Study 3, we investigated this difference in
counterfactual thinking and measured personal regulatory values,
as well as perceived consensual regulatory values, to explore
whether the latter mediates culture differences in counterfactual
bias.
Method
Participants
One hundred twenty European American undergraduates (45%
men) and 85 Chinese undergraduates (29% men) participated in
Study 3. As the two samples differed in terms of gender propor-
tions, 2(1, N  205)  5.18, p  .03, we controlled for the effect
of gender in the analyses. Overall, gender did not have any main
effect or moderate any of the effects in these analyses.
Measures
Counterfactual thinking. Counterfactuals are often evoked
when people think of negative events (Roese, 1994). In this study,
we had the participants first recall a negative event and then
generate a counterfactual scenario in the frame “If only . . . ,
then . . .” Following previous cross-cultural research in counter-
factual thinking (Chen et al., 2006), the participants completed this
task in each of the following five domains: schoolwork, romance,
family, friendship, and general.
Two independent coders read each completed sentence and
decided whether or not the sentence expressed (a) an additive
counterfactual and/or (b) a subtractive counterfactual. An additive
counterfactual thought inserts an antecedent factor that was not
present, for example, “If only I had called my mom, then I would
not have felt so bad now.” A subtractive counterfactual deletes a
factor that was present, for example, “If only I had not broken up
with my ex-girlfriend, then we would still be together.” Some
responses contained both an additive counterfactual thought and a
subtractive counterfactual thought (e.g., “If only I had not gone to
the party and had studied for the exam, then I would have gotten
a better grade”). Hence additive and subtractive counterfactuals
were treated as two independent categories, rather than as mutually
exclusive categories.
One European American and one Chinese English bilingual
coded the American participants’ responses, and two Chinese
coders coded the Chinese participants’ responses. Intercoder reli-
ability was acceptable: 97.8% for American participants’ additive
counterfactuals, 97.7% for American participants’ subtractive
counterfactuals, 90.2% for Chinese participants’ additive counter-
factuals, and 92.0% for Chinese participants’ subtractive counter-
factuals. Disagreement was resolved through discussion between
the coders. The dependent measure was a proportion computed by
dividing the total number of a particular type of counterfactual
across the five domains by five.
Regulatory Focus Questionnaire. The Regulatory Focus
Questionnaire (Higgins et al., 2001) measures promotion and
prevention focus. First, participants answered the standard scale
tapping their personal regulatory orientation. Then they answered
a minimally different scale tapping their perception of the cultur-
ally consensual orientation. Some items are phrased in the form of
a statement. For these items, a participant rates his or her agree-
ment with the statements on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1
(certainly false) to 5 (certainly true). The remaining items are
phrased in the form of a question. For these items, a participant
indicates how often he or she acts or thinks in that particular way
on a 5-point Likert scale ranging from 1 (never or seldom) to 5
(very often). The perceived consensus orientation scale queried
participants’ perception of whether the statements are widely en-
dorsed and the actions widely practiced, for example: “Growing
up, would most Americans ever ‘cross the line’ by doing what their
parents would not tolerate?”; “Did most Americans get on their
parents’ nerves often when they were growing up?”
The regulatory focus scale displayed acceptable reliability in both
the personal and the perceived consensus versions, particularly for the
prevention scales (Chinese participants’ personal orientations were
prevention  .80, promotion  .63; Americans’ personal orientations
were prevention  .76, promotion  .68; Chinese participants’ per-
ceived consensus were prevention .75, promotion .55; Americans’
perceived consensus were prevention  .76, promotion  .50).
Results
Cultural Difference in Counterfactual Thinking
We performed a two-way ANOVA with culture as a between-
participants variable, counterfactuals (additive vs. subtractive) as a
within-participants variable, and gender as a covariate. The anal-
ysis yielded a significant main effect of culture, F(1, 203) 29.84,
p  .001, p2  .13, and a significant two-way interaction, F(1,
203)  8.96, p  .003, p2  .04. Consistent with past research,
Chinese participants, compared with Americans, generated signif-
icantly more subtractive counterfactuals (MAmerican  0.27, SD 
0.19 vs. MChinese  0.43, SD  0.27), t(203)  4.92, p  .001.
Chinese participants also exhibited fewer additive counterfactuals,
but not significantly so (MAmerican  0.72, SD  0.27 vs.
MChinese  0.70, SD  0.20), t(203)  –0.44, p  .65.
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Cultural Difference in Regulatory Focus
To examine cultural differences in regulatory focus, we per-
formed a three-way ANOVA on the regulatory focus measures,
including culture as a between-participants variable and focus
(promotion vs. prevention) and type (personal vs. perceived con-
sensual) as within-participants variables and controlling for gen-
der. The analysis yielded a nonsignificant three-way interaction,
F(1, 203)  0.381, p  .2, but a significant two-way Culture 
Focus interaction, F(1, 203)  8.68, p  .004, p2  .07. That is,
regardless of the types of measures (personal vs. perceived con-
sensual), regulatory focus differs significantly across cultures. To
understand the cross-cultural difference in regulatory focus, we
conducted simple t tests. As shown in Table 3, Chinese partici-
pants’ perceived consensual prevention focus was higher than that
of Americans (MChinese  3.06, SD  0.79 and MAmerican  2.74,
SD  0.61), F(1, 204)  4.01, p  .001, p2  .08. Perceived
consensual promotion focus did not differ across the two cultures
(MAmerican  3.36, SD  0.48; MChinese  3.44, SD  0.62).
Alternatively, American participants’ personal promotion focus
(MAmerican  3.81, SD  0.70) was significantly higher
than Chinese participants’ personal promotion focus (MAmerican 
3.42, SD  0.63), p  .001, F(1, 203)  3.38, p2  .06. The
personal prevention focus does not differ across the two cultures
(MAmerican  3.43, SD  0.48; MChinese  3.42, SD  0.62).
Mediation Analyses
Subtractive counterfactual thoughts differed between American
and Chinese participants, so we tested whether this effect was
mediated by participants’ perceived consensual regulatory focus.
Because we observed significant cultural differences on both per-
sonal promotion focus and perceived consensual prevention focus,
we tested the mediating effect of perceived consensual prevention
focus controlling for the cross-cultural difference in personal pro-
motion focus.
We first regressed our proposed mediator—perceived consen-
sual prevention focus—on culture (0  American, 1  Chinese).
After we controlled for personal promotion focus, Chinese partic-
ipants’ perceptions of the consensuality of prevention-focus
(among their Chinese peers) were higher than American partici-
pants’ perceptions of it (among their American peers;   0.33),
t(203)  4.91, p  .001. Next, we regressed our dependent
measure—subtractive counterfactual thinking—on culture. Chi-
nese participants generated more subtractive counterfactual
thoughts than did Americans (  0.33), t(203)  4.90, p  .001.
In the third regression, we regressed subtractive counterfactual
thinking simultaneously on culture and perceived consensual pre-
vention focus. As illustrated in Figure 4, the effects of culture,
(  0.13), t(203)  1.90, p  .05, and perceived consensual
prevention focus (  0.31), t(203)  4.49, p  .001, both
remained significant. A Sobel test showed that the attenuation of
the culture effect on subtractive counterfactual thinking after con-
trolling for perceived consensual prevention focus was significant
(z  2.92, p  .05). This result is consistent with our hypothesis
that the influence of culture on the bias toward subtractive coun-
terfactual thinking runs through perceptions of the consensuality of
prevention focus among their peers.
Discussion
Study 3 extends the evidence that perceived consensus mediates
cultural effects to another form of social cognition: counterfactual
thinking. The greater tendency of Chinese participants to imagine
away negative outcomes by subtracting antecedent actions from
the scenario arises from their greater perception of the consensu-
ality of prevention focus in their social environment, not from their
greater personal prevention focus. This finding is also consistent
with the basic premise in self-regulation theory that individuals
often draw on the viewpoints of generalized others to regulate the
self (Higgins, 1999).
Study 4: Bicultural People’s Consensus Perceptions
Cross-national comparative quasi-experiments follow the pre-
dominant research design in cross-cultural psychology. Nonethe-
less, they are limited in several ways. In quasi-experiments,
participants are not randomly assigned to conditions (in this
case, cultures), so there may be other differences between the
American and Chinese groups, aside from immersion in differ-
ent cultural traditions, that account for the group difference in
the dependent variable (Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martinez,
2000; Matsumoto & Yoo, 2006). It is conceivable, for example,
that country differences in judgment patterns reflect biases
arising from other environmental factors that are not inherently
tied to culture. Moreover, although the meditational analyses
are consistent with the proposal that effects of country work
through the mechanism of perceived consensual beliefs and
values., the results are not conclusive; it is always possible that
perceived consensus is confounded with some other individual
difference dimension, which we have not identified yet, and that
this other dimension could be the true mechanism.
A complementary method for testing cultural influences is
experimentally varying whether a culture is salient. Making a
culture identity salient leads to greater use of associated knowl-
edge (Hong et al., 2000), such as representations of the culture’s
consensual views. Experimentally manipulating the salience of
cultures is particularly valuable with bicultural people. Re-
search finds that Chinese American bicultural people can ex-
hibit either Chinese or American attributional biases, depending
on which culture is made salient (Hong, 2009). Moreover, given
that individuals differ somewhat in their assumptions about the
consensual beliefs in these respective cultures, the effect of
making a culture salient should be conditioned by these indi-
Table 3
Promotion and Prevention Focus in Personal Beliefs and
Perceived Consensual Beliefs (Study 3)
Variable
Chinese American
M SD M SD
Personal values
Promotion 3.42 0.63 3.81 0.71
Prevention 3.22 0.61 3.43 0.48
Perceived consensual values
Promotion 3.44 0.62 3.36 0.48
Prevention 3.06 0.79 2.74 0.61
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vidual differences in assumptions. In an analogous effect, for
example, Benjamin, Choi, and Strickland (2007) found that
when gender is made salient, women become more risk-averse
and men become more risk-seeking, especially those men and
women who assume that traditional gender roles persist.
Study 4 involved Hong Kong university students, who are
steeped in both Chinese and American cultures (Fu et al., 2007;
Hong et al., 2000). By randomly assigning them to either the
American culture or the Chinese culture salience conditions, we
controlled for all factors other than activated cultural knowledge.
We manipulated cultural salience by varying the identity of the
ostensible “investigator,” the expected audience of the partici-
pants’ responses (Briley, Morris, & Simonson, 2005).
After American or Chinese culture was made salient through the
audience manipulation, we measured attributions using the non-
transparent fish judgment task. Then we measured participants’
beliefs about dispositional and situational theories of behavior,
including participants’ personal endorsement of those beliefs, as
well as their perceptions of consensual American views and con-
sensual Chinese views. We predicted that attributional judgment
would reflect which culture was made salient and, more specifi-
cally, the participants’ particular image of that culture’s consensus.
That is, in the American investigator condition, attributional bias
should be correlated with participants’ perceptions of American
consensual beliefs. Likewise, in the Chinese investigator condi-
tion, it should be correlated with participants’ perceptions of
Chinese consensual beliefs.
Method
Participants
The participants were 121 ethnically Chinese undergraduates at
Hong Kong University (66.1% women). Gender did not have any
main effect or moderate any of the significant effects reported in
these analyses.
Procedure
After they signed the informed consent form, the participants
were given a cover letter that introduced the study and presented
the culture-salience manipulation. In the Chinese culture-salient
condition, the letter was printed on Hong Kong University letter-
head, and the investigator’s last name was an easily recognizable
Hong Kong Chinese name. In the American culture-salient condi-
tion, the letter was printed on Boston University letterhead, the last
name of the researcher was an easily recognizable Anglo-
American name, and it was explained that the participants’ uni-
versity was helping this American researcher collect data for a
research project.
The measures were identical to those in Study 2. The partici-
pants saw a picture of a fish swimming in front of other fish and
responded to the attribution measures. Next, the participants were
given descriptions of the dispositionism and situationism beliefs
(Norenzayan et al., 2002). Besides rating their personal beliefs, the
bicultural participants also rated their perceptions of the consen-
sual beliefs of Hong Kong Chinese and of Americans.4 We coun-
terbalanced the order of the two perceived consensual belief rat-
ings and inserted a 10-min filler task between them. Order did not
have any effect and was not considered further.5
Finally, at the end of the study, the participants were asked to
recall the nationality of the “investigator,” and all participants were
able to do so correctly. They were also asked to use a 7-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 7 (very much) to give
their impressions of this figure’s friendliness, trustworthiness,
knowledge, likeability, and attractiveness. The culture-salience
manipulation did not have a significant effect on any of these
ratings (highest F  2.11, ns). Thus, the results reported subse-
quently were not due to participants having more or less favorable
attitudes toward local versus foreign investigators.
4 Perceived consensus can be measured by the perception of how a
typical member of the culture would respond to a certain item (average
response), or by the perception of how most people in the culture would
respond to it (modal response). Previous studies using these two measures
of perceived consensus have yielded identical results (Wan, Chiu, Peng, &
Tam, 2007; Wan, Chiu, Tam, et al., 2007). As a variation, we measured
perceived consensus with perception of modal response in the current
study.
5 In each culture-salience condition, we also counterbalanced the lan-
guage of the instructions. Half of the participants in each condition re-
ceived the measures in English, and the remaining half received the
measures in Chinese. To make the manipulation realistic, participants in
the Chinese language and American culture-salient condition also learned
that the questionnaire was translated into Chinese with the help of a
Chinese colleague. The language manipulation controlled for potential
linguistic influences on attribution that might confound the effect of
cultural knowledge. Because the language manipulation did not have any
effect, this factor was not considered further.
β = 0.31*β = 0.33* 
Culture:
American or Chinese 
Perceived
Consensual 
Subtractive
Counterfactual Thinking 
    β = 0.13  
  (β = 0.33*) 
Regulatory Focus 
Figure 4. Perceived consensual regulatory focus mediates the effect of culture on subtractive counterfactual
thinking (Study 3).  p  .05.
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Results and Discussion
Dispositionism and Situationism Beliefs
We first examined the correlation between participants’ per-
sonal beliefs and their perceptions of consensual American and
Chinese beliefs. Personal belief in dispositionism showed a modest
positive association with perceived consensual American disposi-
tionism (r .35, p .001) and consensual Chinese dispositionism
(r  .33, p  .001). Likewise, personal belief in situationism was
positively associated with perceived consensual American situ-
ationism (r  .35, p  .001) and consensual Chinese situationism
(r .30, p .001). This suggests that the personal beliefs of these
bicultural participants were moderately and about equally similar
to their perceptions of Chinese and American consensual beliefs.
Next, we conducted a Culture (between-participants factor:
American or Chinese)  Type (within-participants factor: per-
sonal, consensual Chinese, or consensual American)  Belief
(within-participants factor: dispositionism or situationism) analy-
sis. Fortunately, none of the effects involving the culture salience
manipulation were significant (Fs 1, ps .5). This indicates that
the manipulation did not contaminate measures of personal beliefs
or perceived consensual beliefs.
There was a significant Type  Belief interaction, F(1, 119) 
12.90, p  .001, p2  .10. This effect reflected differences in the
consensual beliefs that our bicultural participants imputed to
American versus Chinese culture. Consistent with the findings of
Study 2, participants perceived higher consensual dispositionism
in American (MAmerican  6.63, SD  1.58) than Chinese culture
(MChinese  5.61, SD  1.67), t(119)  5.66, p  .001, and
accordingly, lower consensual situationism (MAmerican  5.73,
SD  1.73; MChinese  6.16, SD  1.52), t(119)  2.41, p  .02.
When we compared within groups, consensual American disposi-
tionism was perceived to be higher than consensual American
situationism, t(119)  4.59, p  .001, and consensual Chinese
situationism was perceived to be higher than consensual Chinese
dispositionism, t(119)  2.75, p  .007. In contrast with the
perceived cultural beliefs, personal beliefs in dispositionism and
situationism did not differ significantly (ts  1, ps  .5).
Test of Perceived Consensus Beliefs as a Mechanism
Shaping Attributions
To test our critical hypothesis, we conducted a regression anal-
ysis on a summary measure of attribution bias (internal
attribution–external attribution). We first regressed the attribution
measure on a dummy variable for the culture manipulation (0 
Chinese, 1  American) and the six belief measures (i.e., personal
beliefs, perceived consensual American beliefs, and perceived
consensual Chinese beliefs for both dispositionism and situation-
ism). Next, we entered the interaction between the culture manip-
ulation and each of the six beliefs. As expected, effects of the
culture manipulation on attributional bias were moderated by
perceived consensual beliefs and not by personal beliefs. The
culture manipulation interacted with perceived consensual Chinese
dispositionism (standardized   –0.28), t(119) –1.99, p .05,
and with perceived consensual American dispositionism (standard-
ized   0.35), t(119)  2.32, p  .05. We expected such
interactions from the premise that participants’ image of each
culture (perceived American consensual beliefs and Chinese con-
sensual beliefs) would affect their attributions only when this
cultural knowledge is activated.
The pattern of these interactions is illustrated in Figure 5, which
shows the effect of each of the six beliefs (standardized betas) in
the Chinese culture salient condition and American culture salient
condition, respectively. Underlying the first interaction effect,
perceived consensual American dispositionism was related to
increased internal attribution in the American culture salient con-
dition (standardized   0.55), t(119)  3.78, p  .001, but not in
the Chinese culture salient condition (standardized   –0.015),
t(119)  	0.56, p  .5. Underlying the second interaction effect,
perceived consensual Chinese dispositionism was more strongly
associated with internal attribution in the Chinese culture salient
Figure 5. Association between causal theories and internal versus external attribution in the Chinese and
American conditions (Study 4). Two significant interactions were highlighted. One is the interaction between
perceived Hong Kong dispositionism and the cultural context manipulation; the other is the interaction between
perceived American dispositionism and the cultural context manipulation; that is, the two betas significantly
differ from each other. Error bars represent the standard error of the estimated betas.  p  .05.
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condition (standardized   0.24), t(119)  1.23, p  .11, than it
was in the American culture salient condition (standardized  
–0.32), t(119)  1.95, p  .08.6
General Discussion
The primary goal of the present research was to investigate
whether culture impinges on individual thoughts and behaviors
through perceptions of consensus or “common sense” and whether
these representations of socially shared ideas guide people’s judg-
ments. Study 1 examined Americans’ and Poles’ personal collec-
tivism and their perceptions of the consensual collectivism within
their respective societies. Whereas personal collectivism did not
differ across countries, perceived consensual collectivism differed
in the way expected: Poles perceived collectivism to be more
consensual in their society than Americans did in their society, and
this individual-level variable mediated the effect of country on
sensitivity to different types of compliance pressure. The next
studies replicated this mediation result in investigations of differ-
ent beliefs and different social judgments known to differ cross-
culturally. Perceived consensual belief in dispositionism mediated
American versus Chinese cultural differences in attribution judg-
ments (Study 2). Likewise, perceived consensual regulatory focus
mediated differences between these cultures in counterfactual
thinking (Study 3). Finally, an experiment with bicultural partici-
pants found that manipulating the salient culture affected whether
their judgments were implicitly guided by their assumptions about
American consensual beliefs or their assumptions about Chinese
consensual beliefs. (Study 4).
Although our analyses in Studies 1 to 3 focused on perceived
consensus as a mediator of cultural differences, further analyses
probed other questions. Separate analyses for each cultural sample
in all three studies showed that perceived cultural consensus sig-
nificantly predicted social judgment, indicating that individual
differences within a country enable prediction of which individuals
exhibit culturally traditional biases. Also, in all three studies,
country did not moderate the relationship between perceived con-
sensus and social judgment, indicating that the effect of perceived
cultural consensus is equally strong across cultures. Although
Study 1 indicated that Poles are more likely than Americans to
conform to consensus information about their student peers (con-
sistent with collectivist emphasis on adherence to the norms of
tight ingroups), there was no corresponding difference in confor-
mity to perceived consensus at a cultural level.7 In sum, individ-
ualists, just as much as collectivists, adhere to what they perceive
to be consensual or common sense in their culture.
Implications
Conceptualization of Culture as Shared Knowledge
A recurring question in social science is how best to conceptu-
alize culture. Psychology and anthropology studies have explored
various conceptualizations. The dominant paradigm in cross-
cultural psychology has been studying culture in the inward self-
concepts, values, and beliefs of individual members (Ashton et al.,
2005; Bond, 1988; Triandis, 1989). This atomistic view of each
individual independently following his or her own personal copy
of the cultural instructions is preceded in anthropology by the
cognitive approach of Goodenough (1961, 1971), which sought to
identify the cognitive structures that underlie individual cultural
performances.
Opposite this approach is the more holistic view that culture
exists at a collective, emergent level, beyond the plane of individ-
uals’ thoughts. Some cross-cultural psychologists have advocated
studying culture in the attributes of collectivities, usually coun-
tries, such as economic, political, and health statistics (Georgas &
Berry, 1995; Sawyer, 1967). Conceptually, albeit not methodolog-
ically, this corresponds to classical anthropological assumptions
that treated culture as an emergent collective-level system (see
Herskovits, 1955).
In between these atomistic and holistic perspectives, the ap-
proach that our research supports conceptualizes culture as shared
knowledge. In this conceptualization, culture does not exist within
the individual’s private knowledge but does not entirely transcend
the individual either; it exists largely in public discourse (Geertz,
1973, 1983). This can be seen in the particular form of shared
knowledge on which we have focused—perceived consensus—in
that it is an outward-looking representation about one’s fellows,
and it is co-constructed, and continually reconstructed, through
one’s communication with them. It is not, like a personal belief or
value, purely an internal matter, entirely under one’s personal
control (Chiu & Hong, 2005; Shore, 1996). That is why culture can
feel, at the same time, like something that is under one’s skin, part
of the self, and like something external, constraining the self. Our
conceptualization is particularly close to Keesing’s (1974) descrip-
tion of cultural competence as the individual’s “theory of what his
fellows know . . . the code being followed, the game being played”
(p. 89). Although we have focused on perceived consensus, this
conceptualization suggests other representations, such as knowl-
edge of institutionalized rules, which also determine cultural biases
in decisions that cannot be explained by people’s private prefer-
ences (see Yamagishi, Hashimoto, & Schug, 2008). In sum, the
conceptualization of culture as shared, public knowledge points to
a rich perspective for future research in cultural psychology.
6 Although the findings for personal beliefs and perceived consensual
dispositionism are as predicted, we did not find the predicted interaction for
perceived consensual situationism. This was expected particularly in the
Chinese culture-salient condition, given that participants perceived high
consensual situationism in Chinese culture. One possible interpretation, in
light of the Study 2 results, is that assumptions about consensual situation-
ism are less potent shapers of attributions than are those about consensual
dispositionism. More research is needed on this point.
7 Specifically, we conducted both within-country and between-country
analyses. Of the six samples from Studies 1–3, we tested whether perceived
consensus predicts social judgment, and all the main effects within each
culture were consistent with our predictions ( ps  .055). We, for three
studies, tested whether country moderated the effect of perceived consen-
sus. There was no significant effect of the interaction terms between
country and perceived consensus in predicting judgment in Study 2 and
Study 3 ( ps  .7). Unexpectedly, we found that the country moderating
effect was significant in Study 1 ( p  .06). However, the interaction effect
suggested that the perceived consensus had a stronger effect in the Amer-
ican sample than in the Polish sample.
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Differentiating Culture and Self
For some kinds of groups, distinguishing perceptions of consensus
from self-perceptions is difficult because people tend to project their
own views onto the ingroup (Robbins & Krueger, 2005). Studies that
have measured perceptions of culture-wide consensus show fewer
signs that people project their own values onto these groups (Hofst-
ede, 2005). Nevertheless, the mechanism of self-projection onto
groups raises a possible alternative explanation for our key finding,
namely that perceived consensus only predicts judgments because it is
projected from self-perceptions. The predictions of this self-projection
explanation are that individuals’ personal views and perceived con-
sensus views are highly correlated and that individuals’ personal
views have the causal primacy. Although in our samples we observed
a positive association between personal views and perceived cultural
consensus, the effect of perceived consensus shows a significantly
stronger association with the behavioral outcome measures than does
the effect of personal views. Furthermore, we tested and did not find
support for the alternative, reverse mediation model (culture3 judg-
ment 3 perceived consensus) in Studies 1–3 (Sobel’s z for the
reversed model 1.62 in Study 1, 1.64 in Study 2, and 1.74 in Study
3; all ns). The results rule out the possibility that individuals’ percep-
tions of cultural consensus are constructed on the fly on the basis of
their judgments in the task.
More important, the cognitive effects of perceived cultural con-
sensus obtained in our studies do not implicate the self: Neither
personal beliefs nor the alignment of personal beliefs with the
perceived cultural consensus, mediated or moderated the effects.
Self-identities may play an important role in cultural influence, as
theories of social identity and self-categorization (Turner, 1991;
Turner et al., 1994) posit. However, perceived cultural consensus
and the self are likely to be two separate paths through which
culture impacts social cognitions.
Acculturation of Immigrants and Sojourners
How do immigrants or sojourners come to think and act like natives
of the host culture? Although this is traditionally portrayed as a slow
and emotionally fraught process, our analysis of cultural influence
suggests that acculturation in thought patterns may occur through
spontaneous, preconscious processes of forming perceptions of con-
sensual patterns and relying on them as bases for judgments and
decisions. Indirect evidence for the role of perceived consensus comes
from studies of immigrants that have included the motivational di-
mension of need for closure, which creates a drive for consensus with
the salient ingroup. Individuals who move by themselves to another
culture acculturate more quickly if they are high in need for closure,
yet those who move as part of a heritage culture group acculturate
more slowly if they are high in need for closure (Kosic, Kruglanski,
Pierro, & Mannetti, 2004). Likewise, other studies suggest that ac-
culturation is quicker for individuals whose perceptions of the host
culture’s consensual patterns are similar to the average of the host
culture natives’ perceptions. (Kurman & Ronen-Eilon, 2004).
The role of perceived consensus may also account for why not only
immigrants but even sojourners—people engaging in another culture
for a limited visit—take on some of its psychological tendencies.
Self-esteem tends to be lower in Japan than in the West (Heine,
Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999). A surprising finding is that
Japanese people, after half a year in Canada, exhibit significantly
higher self-esteem, whereas Canadians in Japan exhibit significantly
lower self-esteem (Heine & Lehman, 2004). Similarly, there are
cultural biases in visual judgments of line length and similarity.
Japanese people temporarily studying in America begin to show the
characteristic American patterns, whereas Americans studying in Ja-
pan begin to show the characteristic Japanese patterns (Kitayama,
Duffy, Kawamura, & Larsen, 2003). Sojouners’ self-esteem changes
have been explained in terms of enacting stereotypical manners or
socially desirable responses (Heine & Lehman, 2004). Although this
explanation is possible with regard to self-esteem measures, it strains
credulity that sojourners consciously conform to cultural biases in
line-length judgments. These cognitive patterns have been explained
in terms of self-selection of visitors to cultures where their style of
thinking fits (Kitayama, Ishii, Imada, Takemura, &
Ramaswamy, 2006). We propose a different mechanism for both
sojourner findings, one that is more akin to unintentionally picking up
local accents and expressions when traveling. That is, through inter-
acting with the host culture, people acquire tacit perceptions of pre-
vailing beliefs, values, and behavioral tendencies. These judgments
and perceptions then exert directive force over behavior. This accul-
turation process does not hinge upon conversion of self-concept or
personal beliefs (cf. Sussman, 2000). Instead, people may have the
capacity like radios, to pick up the local frequency in a new cultural
environment and to output the corresponding signals. Sojourners’
tendency to spontaneously and rapidly adopt emotional and cognitive
tendencies from a host culture is a fascinating topic for future re-
search.
Cultural Persistence and Change
Pluralistic ignorance provides an account for why traditional ways
and practices persist despite changes in private beliefs and values. It
also offers distinctive insights about why cultures sometimes do
change dramatically. If people’s behaviors depend on what they
perceive to be the consensus, and these perceptions depend on their
peers’ behaviors, then it is not surprising that interventions that
change these perceptions can shift people’s behaviors and that this can
then cascade to shift others’ behaviors (D. Cohen, 2001; Kuran,
1995). For instance, the thousand-year-old practice of foot-binding in
China changed quickly through this dynamic. In the province of
Dingzhou, for example, 99% of the women had their feet bound in
1889, whereas almost none did 30 years later (Mackie, 1996). Activ-
ists encouraged the more progressive families to publicly commit to
not bind their daughters’ feet. Then, seeing that some of their neigh-
bors were not foot-binding, moderate families also stopped doing it.
Once a majority of families stopped, then the practice dramatically
declined, virtually disappearing from the culture. Around the same
time in the United States, during Prohibition, people believed that
most Americans supported the law, in large part because it was
socially undesirable to publicly defend alcohol, and few people did.
However, when opinion polls revealed that most Americans privately
disliked the law, support fell lower and the law was repealed (Katz &
Schnack, 1938). In sum, conformity to perceived consensus creates
tipping points in social change. This analysis suggests very different
strategies for fostering cultural change, or resisting it, than are implied
by a view of cultural practices as rooted in deep-seated inner values.
Our model also provides insights about cultural evolution. Diver-
sity in consensus perceptions produces variation in judgment and
decision biases, even when all individuals are simply conforming to
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their perceptions of the consensus. In proposing his view that per-
ceived consensus differs across individual members of a culture,
Keesing (1981) said, “It seems likely that a range of diversity in the
individual versions of the ‘common’ culture is not simply a social
imperfection, but an adaptive necessity: a crucial resource that can be
drawn on and selected from in cultural change” (p. 88). This diversity
in biases or strategies enables cultural evolution through population-
level learning, in that changing ecological conditions reward different
members of the population, giving them success and prestige, which
then leads their biases/strategies to be imitated by others (Henrich &
Gil-White, 2001).
Limitations and Future Research
As an initial step to establish perceived cultural consensus as a
mechanism for explaining cross-cultural difference, in the present
research, we investigated known cultural differences to examine the
mechanisms of perceived cultural consensus and personal beliefs.
Because the concept of perceived cultural consensus resembles that of
ingroup prototypes, in many respects, the present research broaches a
larger theoretical question: how culture is theoretically distinct from
groups. We hold, with Kashima (2000), that whereas group (or
society) refers to an assemblage of related individuals that can be
considered as a social unit, culture refers to the knowledge tradition
that is collectively constructed over generations to assign meanings
and significance to the group’s social experiences (see also Barth,
2002; Chiu & Hong, 2006; Rohner, 1984). Future work should
address the dynamics and complex association between the perceived
cultural consensus and the critical group variables, such as group
prototypes and group identification.
Perceived Cultural Consensus Versus Group Prototypes
Although, within a society, there are considerable individual dif-
ferences in the values and beliefs that are perceived to be widely
shared in the society, our results also revealed substantial agreement
in the social representation of culture. Social identity research has
given psychology many insights about how intergroup comparisons
facilitate the construction of group representations (Hogg, 2004;
Turner et al., 1987). However, even within that tradition, some re-
searchers have identified the role of communication in sustaining
group representations in the absence of intergroup comparison (Post-
mes et al., 2005; see also Moreland, Argote, & Krishnan, 1996).
Comparison may be less likely for broadly encompassing traditions,
such as Western culture or Chinese culture, than for narrower social
categories. Residents of a remote village in the center of America or
of China may not reflect on their culture as a category or compare it
with other cultural categories. Yet they nonetheless have well-
elaborated representations of common sense, of perceived consensus.
Perceived Consensus and Cultural Identification
Analogous to group identification is the construct of cultural
identification—the extent to which individuals feel at one with
their cultures (Oakes et al., 1994; Turner et al., 1987). On the one
hand, cultural identification may moderate the effect of perceived
cultural consensus on judgment. From the perspective of social
identity theory, high group identification amplifies the perceived
relevance of ingroup prototype and relies on it as a guide to
judgment (Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Terry & Hogg, 1996). This
suggests that people with high cultural identification may be more
likely to anchor their judgments on their perception of the cultural
consensus. Indeed research has found that the link between need
for closure and adherence to perceived cultural consensus is stron-
ger among participants high in cultural identification (Chao,
Zhang, & Chiu, in press).
On the other hand, when a perceived cultural consensus is viewed
as highly relevant to a judgment, perceivers may use their represen-
tation of the consensus to guide their judgment, irrespective of their
level of cultural identification. Although the current studies lack a
direct measure of cultural identification, we probed this issue by
constructing a rough proxy for identification, the absolute-value dif-
ference score between personal beliefs and perceived consensual
beliefs (similar to the measure reported in Wan et al., 2007b). This
variable did not moderate the effect of perceived cultural consensus in
any of our studies. Although it is not conclusive, this result suggests
that cultural identification may operate more indirectly than the anal-
ogous construct of group identification. Future research should di-
rectly measure cultural identification and probe its similarities to and
differences from group identification.
Possible Mechanisms of Cultural Consensus Effects
Another question for future research is how perceived societal
consensus influences judgment. Perceived consensus could influence
judgements through heuristic systematic processes (Eagly & Chaiken,
1993). Perceived consensus may serve as an anchor when processing
intuitively and spontaneously (Kahneman, 2003; Stanovich & West,
2000). Alternatively, in more analytic, deliberate processing, per-
ceived consensus may play a role in critical reflections on one’s
judgments or decisions. Even when accuracy is the processing goal in
the judgment context, people often use match with ingroup beliefs to
verify their personal beliefs (Turner, 1991). For instance, research has
shown that the purported positions of an individual’s political party on
certain public policies can powerfully shape policy judgments (G. L.
Cohen, 2003). As Festinger (1950) argued, we regard an answer as
“correct, valid, and proper to the extent that it is anchored in a group
of people with similar beliefs” (p. 272). Future research should in-
vestigate the role of perceived consensus in both intuitive and ana-
lytical process. In conclusion, this article advances an alternative
model of the cognitive mechanism through which culture shapes
many social judgments, situating the mechanism in individuals’
outward-looking perceptions of their cultural fellows, rather than in
individuals’ inward-looking self-perceptions.
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Appendix
Causal Beliefs
Dispositionism Description
How people behave is mostly determined by their personality.
One’s personality predisposes and guides an individual to behave in
one way, not in another way, no matter the circumstances. In a sense,
behavior is an unfolding of personality. One’s behavior is remarkably
stable across time and consistent across situations because it is guided
by personality. Therefore, if we know the personality of one person,
we can easily predict how the person will behave in the future and
explain why that person behaved in a particular way in the past.
Situationism Description
How people behave is mostly determined by the situation in
which they find themselves. Situation power is so strong that
we can say it has more influence on behavior than one’s
personality. Often, people in a particular situation behave very
similarly, despite large individual differences in personality.
Therefore, to predict and explain one’s behavior, we have to
focus on the situation, rather than personality. Personality plays
a weaker role in behavior than we used to think.
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